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Abstract 
 
The implementation of ‘good governance’ in Indonesia’s regional government sector became 
a central tenet in governance research following the introduction of the national code for 
governance in 2006. The code was originally drafted in 1999 as a response to the Asian 
financial crises and many cases of unearthed corruption, collusion, and nepotism. It was 
reviewed in 2001 and again in 2006 to incorporate relevant political, economical, and social 
developments. Even though the national code exists along with many regional government 
decrees on good governance, the extent of implementation of the tenets of good governance 
in Indonesia’s regional government is still questioned. Previous research on good governance 
implementation in Indonesian regional government (Mardiasmo, Barnes and Sakurai, 2008) 
identified differences in the nature and depth of implementation between various Indonesian 
regional governments. This paper analyses and extends this recent work and explores key 
factors that may impede the implementation and sustained application of governance 
practices across regional settings. 
 
The bureaucratic culture of Indonesian regional government is one that has been shaped for 
over approximately 30 years, in particular during that of the Soeharto regime. Previous 
research on this regime suggests a bureaucratic culture with a mix of positive and negative 
aspects. On one hand Soeharto’s regime resulted in strong development growth and strong 
economic fundamentals, resulting in Indonesia being recognised as one of the Asian 
economic tigers prior to the 1997 Asian financial crises. The financial crises however 
revealed a bureaucratic culture that was rife with corruption, collusion, and nepotism. 
Although subsequent Indonesian governments have been committed to eradicating 
entrenched practices it seems apparent that the culture is ingrained within the bureaucracy 
and eradication of it will take time. Informants from regional government agree with this 
observation, as they identify good governance as an innovative mechanism and to implement 
it will mean a deviation from the “old ways.” Thus there is a need for a “changed” mind set in 
order to implement sustained governance practices. Such an exercise has proven to be 
challenging so far, as there is “hidden” resistance from within the bureaucracy to change its 
ways.  
 
The inertia of such bureaucratic cultures forms a tension against the opportunity for the 
implementation of good governance.  From this context an emergent finding is the existence 
of a ‘bureaucratic generation gap’ as an impeding variable to enhanced and more efficient 
implementation of governance systems. It was found that after the Asian financial crises the 
Indonesian government (both at national and regional level) drew upon a wider human 
resources pool to fill government positions – including entrants from academia, the private 
sector, international institutions, foreign nationals and new graduates.   It suggested that this 
change in human capital within government is at the core of this ‘inter-generational divide.’  
 
This divergence is exemplified, at one extreme, by [older] bureaucrats who have been in-
position for long periods of time serving during the extended Soeharto regime. The “new” 
bureaucrats have only sat in their positions since the end of Asian financial crisis and did not 
serve during Soeharto’s regime.   It is argued that the existence of this generation gap and 
associated aspects of organisational culture have significantly impeded modernising 
governance practices across regional Indonesia.  
 
This paper examines the experiences of government employees in five Indonesian regions: 
Solok, Padang, Gorontalo, Bali, and Jakarta. Each regional government is examined using a 
mixed methodology comprising of on-site observation, document analysis, and iterative semi-
structured interviewing.   Drawing from the experiences of five regional governments in 
implementing good governance this paper seeks to better understand the causal contexts of 
variable implementation governance practices and to suggest enhancements to the 
development of policies for sustainable inter-generational change in governance practice 
across regional government settings. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The implementation of ‘good governance’ in many south east Asian countries has been a 
central tenet in governance research following the aftermath of Asian financial crisis in 1997 
(Anderson and Strutt 1999; Connors 1999; Henley 2002; Lewis 2005; Li 2003; Soesastro 
2000), where many affected countries introduced enhancements of existing corporate 
governance arrangements and regulations. Indonesia drafted a national code for governance 
in 1999 as a response to the Asian financial crises and many cases of unearthed corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism. The code was reviewed and officially released in 2001, and further 
reviewed in 2006 to incorporate relevant political, economic, and social developments. Even 
though the national code of good governance exists along with several regional government 
decrees on improving governance arrangements, the extent of implementation of the tenets of 
good governance in Indonesia’s regional government remains questioned. Our previous 
research on good governance implementation in Indonesian regional government (Mardiasmo 
,Barnes and Sakurai 2008) identified disparity in the nature and depth of implementation 
between various Indonesian regional governments – ranging from low implementation to 
high implementation. This paper analyses and extends this recent work by exploring the key 
factors that may impede good governance implementation and sustained application of 
governance practices across regional settings.  
 
In our previous research (Mardiasmo ,Barnes and Sakurai 2008) we derived from detailed 
fieldwork in four regional governments within Indonesia: Solok, Gorontalo, Padang, and 
Denpasar. These four regional governments exemplify two main variables: the date that they 
were established (pre and post financial crises) and the region’s proximity to central 
government in Jakarta. Thus the four regional governments depict two under-pinning 
hypothetical considerations: a) that differences might exist between established and more 
recent regional administrations, and b) proximity to the capital, Jakarta, may influence the 
nature and flexibility of implementation governance arrangements. Investigation in each of 
the four regional government locations involved on-site observations, document analyses, and 
in-depth interviews1. One of the main results of our previous investigation is recognition of a 
disparity in understanding of good governance within different levels of regional government 
                                                 
1 For further information on the methodology adopted during this study please refer to our previous study: 
Mardiasmo, D., P. Barnes and Y. Sakurai, 2008. Good Governance Implementation at Regional Governments in 
Indonesia: The Challenges. In XXII International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM). Brisbane 
Australia.  
employees as well as between different regional governments. This is reflected in the 
disparity of good governance implementation in Indonesian regional government, varying 
from low to high. Also found was a disparity between the notion of good governance in 
theory and in practice.  Although plans to implement good governance protocols exist, actual 
implementation was inconsistent.  It seems apparent that the Indonesian government faces an 
issue common to much of the public sector, globally: that is where innovation exists on 
paper, in the form of policies and publications but lacks degrees of the on-the-ground 
actuality. We acknowledge that realistic timeframes and implementation plans may not have 
been available to regional governments.  
 
A number of impeding variables to implementing good governance were identified in our 
previous research (Mardiasmo ,Barnes and Sakurai 2008). These include inconsistent 
communication, an absence of implementation guidelines for good governance, coercive 
influence of leadership, variable human resource capability and expertise within regional 
government, political history – including customs and culture, the remuneration system and 
employee welfare, minimal standards of expertise in the public service.2  Of these impeding 
variables political history and customs and culture were suggested by regional government 
employees as the most dominant issues.  The bureaucratic culture of Indonesian regional 
government is one that has been shaped for over thirty-years; in particular during that of 
Soeharto’s regime. Previous research on this regime suggests a bureaucratic culture with a 
mix of positive and negative impact. On one hand Soeharto’s regime resulted in strong 
development and economic fundamentals, resulting in Indonesia being recognised as one of 
the Asian economic tigers prior to the 1997 Asian financial crises. The immediate period 
after the financial crises however revealed a bureaucratic culture that was rife with 
corruption, collusion, and nepotism.  
 
Although subsequent Indonesian governments have been committed to eradicating 
entrenched practices it seems apparent that the culture is ingrained within the bureaucracy 
and its eradication will take time. Regional government informants agree with this 
observation, as they identify good governance as an innovative mechanism and to implement 
it will mean a deviation from the “old ways.” Thus there is a need for a “changed” mind-set 
                                                 
2 For further explanation of each impeding variable please refer to our previous work: Mardiasmo, D., Barnes, 
P. & Sakurai, Y.  2008. Good Governance Implementation at Regional Governments in Indonesia: The 
Challenges. In XXII International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM). Brisbane Australia. 
in order to implement sustained governance practices. Such an exercise has proven to be 
challenging so far, as there is “hidden” resistance from within the bureaucracy to change its 
ways. The inertia of such bureaucratic cultures forms a tension against the opportunity for the 
implementation of good governance.  An emergent finding is the existence of a ‘bureaucratic 
generation gap.’  The genesis of this ‘gap’ both at a national and a regional level was access 
to a wider human resources pool to fill government positions.  This included entrants from 
academia, the private sector, international institutions, foreign nationals and new graduates.   
It suggested that this change in human capital within government resulted in the ‘bureaucratic 
generation gap.’  
 
The opposite aspect of this divergence was [older] bureaucrats who had been in-position for 
long periods of time serving during the extended Soeharto regime. In contrast the “new” 
bureaucrats have only sat in their positions since the end of Asian financial crisis and did not 
serve during Soeharto’s regime.   This paper argues that the existence of this generation gap 
contributed significantly to difficulties in effectively implementing governance practices 
across regional Indonesia.  
 
2. Good Governance in Indonesian Regional Government 
 
Good governance has been recognised as old values repackaged into a modern format 
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2004). The term good governance itself has been known and 
associated in the past as an attribute of governments with priorities in servicing society 
(Notten 1984), where notions of transparency, accountability, and participatory decision 
making was assumed in the behaviour and traits of a government official (Love 1992). Some 
literature suggests that “current” approaches to good governance are simply a repackaging of 
the previous forms and an attempt to re-introduce the “old ways” into modern society 
(Verschoor 2002; Taylor 2000). In some ways this description fits the Indonesian 
bureaucratic culture, as it is recognised that good governance is supposedly “built in” in 
government service, however due to the political culture of Soeharto’s regime these values 
were “momentarily forgotten”. The Asian financial crisis was a seminal point in the political 
economy of the region causing strong impacts on Soeharto’s regime and a yearning for “old” 
governance values.  Arguably, these “old” values were repackaged to be seen as a new 
phenomena and a new way of governing. The fact that international institutions and the world 
made this such a big deal didn’t help either.  
 An analysis of literature on governance in Indonesia shows a similar pattern.  A number of 
authors concluded that while good governance policies are in place and evidence of their 
implementation exists, more time is needed until a fuller implementation is achieved (Beeson 
2001; Court 2002; Doornbos 2003; Hout 2002; Knack 2002). Interestingly there are authors 
who questioned the characteristics and measurement of full good governance implementation 
– the main argument here is that good governance itself is considered a soft concept without 
concrete measurements (Hausermann 2002; Huther and Shah 1998; Kaufmann ,Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton 2000). This paper does not attempt an answer instead focusing on the contexts 
of why regional governments in Indonesia need ‘more time’ to fully implement good 
governance. Such needs arguably relate also to Indonesia’s decentralisation policy, which 
was introduced in 1999 to allow regional government autonomy on the development of its 
region and allocation of resources. Our previous research (Mardiasmo ,Barnes and Sakurai 
2008) noted a tendency for regional governments to differ in maturity in terms of being able 
to access physical and capital resources, vision and mission, and in relation to stages of 
development. The effect of these disparities made more critical with consideration of the 
decentralisation policy.  
 
Naturally this resulted in suspicion that new regional governments would have less 
experience in governing than older regional governments, and thus be the cause of reduced 
implementation of governance practice. Our previous research (Mardiasmo ,Barnes and 
Sakurai 2008) however contradicts this suspicion. New regional governments were found to 
have higher levels of governance implementation than older regional governments.  Our 
previous research also identified that there is a discrepancy in understanding between 
different levels of regional government employees regarding the tenets of good governance. 
It was found that high level officials (i.e Governor, Heads of Department, Regional Secretary, 
etc) are able to explain the theory of good governance and how it is exemplified in the 
region’s rules, regulations, mission and vision. They are also able to explain to what extent it 
is being implemented through examples of action plans and current events. Middle level 
officials (i.e sub-head departments, sub-head of divisions, etc) were able to recite the 
definition of good governance and its principles as well as provide examples of how it might 
be implemented in the region. Our interviews with middle level officials proved to be an 
intriguing one as the contrast of understanding between them and higher level officials was 
quite extraordinary.  The High-level officials explained their concept of good governance - 
the bigger picture - whereas middle-level officials quoted text-book definitions of good 
governance and principles. This discrepancy was further noticeable when the conversation 
moved to policy implementation as middle level officials were only able to provide vague 
examples of what could be good governance in action.  Conversations with lower level 
officials (i.e staff of a department or division) revealed a workforce that acknowledged the 
importance of good governance, but were unable to explain what good governance principles 
entailed or provide examples of how such principles are exemplified in the region.  
 
We find this to be of considerable concern as differences in understanding regarding 
governance ultimately affects the level of implementation. Differences between higher and 
lower level officials suggests that although good governance principles are exemplified in 
mission and vision statements, its everyday execution is practically non-existent. The level of 
discrepancy in understanding between the four regions is matched by variable levels of 
implementation. Previously (Mardiasmo ,Barnes and Sakurai 2008) we illustrated that there 
is a medium level of good governance implementation in Denpasar and Padang, with high 
levels in Solok and Gorontalo.  Our data showed both Solok and Gorontalo having a more 
thoroughly defined action plan for implementing governance principles. Regional officials 
are able to confirm that plans are in place and are reviewed on a periodical basis.  
 
Although both Denpasar and Padang are aware of good governance principles and have 
included it in their mission and vision statements there was little evidence of new rules, 
regulations, events, or action plans that are specifically designed to address governance 
principles.  Officials in these regions confirmed this by providing vague explanations of how 
it is implemented in everyday work life. Interestingly, although all four regions exhibit 
different levels of progress they all share equal levels of enthusiasm for seeking to put good 
governance arrangements in place.  They all also share the opinion of ‘more time is needed’ 
to ensure full good governance implementation, where it was strongly expressed by regional 
employees that the process to full good governance implementation is a step-by-step process 
due to the magnitude of change in the way of doing things.   
 
 
 
3. Aspects of Political History 
 
The fall of Soeharto in May 1998, triggered by the Asian financial crisis, led Indonesia into a 
new phase known as the reformation era or era reformasi (McLeod 2000; Curtiss 1999). 
Indonesia’s governance system historically operated under a regime in which state 
institutions neglected good governance and the rule of law, where the ‘state’ managed 
essential parts of the corporate sector, and corruption was allowed to rule over common 
interests (Adicondro 2002; Resksodiputro 2002; McLeod 2000). After 32 years of Soeharto’s 
governance system the reformation era witnessed Indonesia targeting specific areas for 
governance reform such as the Constitution, public expenditure, and decentralisation 
(Soesastro 2000). Opinions on this reformation has a general supportive tone, however many 
are also cautious. Research has shown that embedded norms and practices within an 
organisational structure can cause reluctance to change, especially if the change required is of 
bi-polar opposite to the embedded norm (Adicondro 2002; Smith 1971; Reynolds 1994). The 
Soeharto era was closely linked to corruption, collusion, and nepotism; whereas his 
successors have pushed for an era that is based on governance principles such as 
transparency, accountability, professionalism, and participatory – thus a bi-polar change 
(Tambunan 2000; WorldBank 2004). Hence it is understandable that one would assume 
reluctance within government bodies to change from its normal procedure.   
 
Our previous research attempted to determine whether this notion of change applied or not in 
the implementation of good governance principles in the four regional government sample. 
We found that there is a general consensus among regional government officials, where the 
old ways of Soeharto’s regime indeed have a lingering and very profound effect on attempts 
to affect change. An interesting observation was made by Schwarz (1997) and later also made 
by King (2003), was that Soeharto’s successors initiated bureaucratic reform but without 
significant success due to concerns about creating unemployment and political uncertainty. 
These suggestions were further confirmed by regional government employees, who stated 
that (a): change would be difficult if the people (i.e the bureaucrats from Soeharto’s regime) 
remain and (b): change is a frightening prospect since there is high uncertainty in terms of 
employment, political stability, and economic stability. It is interesting, and somewhat 
contradicting that high and middle-level regional officials have knowledge of good 
governance principles and can demonstrate its implementation within a region, yet they are 
sceptical of full good governance implementation due to magnitude of change that it 
suggests.   
 
Another aspect of political history that we find to be impeding to good governance 
implementation is the governing system in Indonesia during Soeharto’s regime. During this 
time governance in Indonesia was much centralised, with the central government having 
ultimate control over regional governments’ resource allocation - resulting in a direct impact 
on the region’s development and strategic outlook.  
 
In 1999 however the governing system in Indonesia took a dramatic change with the 
introduction of widespread policies of decentralisation (KNKG 2006). These policies dictated 
that regional governments should have full authority to innovate and develop their own 
regions in relation to conditions on the ground and resource availability: providing they still 
operated within the ‘corridor’ of central government regulations. This resulted in a shift in 
power, level of control, relationships, and significance of guidelines provided by central 
government. Just like good governance principles, decentralisation autonomy regime is also a 
bi-polar change which can possibly have profound effects on political stability. Already there 
is conflicting views on decentralisation – our interviews show that regional government 
officials feel central government is still reluctant to delegate regional government full 
authority to innovate. Central government officials however expressed that they fear regional 
governments are not prepared for decentralisation responsibilities and there is a need to 
provide them with strict corridors of rules and regulations. Central government also fears that 
if due to the discrepancy in regional government’s stage of development stage and resource 
availability, the current discrepancy will even be wider and may cause tension and unrest as 
opposed to further development. The central government also fears that regional governments 
will interpret the terms ‘decentralisation’ and ‘autonomy’ as total freedom without 
boundaries, which veers away from the concept. Our concern is that the introduction of 
decentralisation autonomy governing system, which was introduced to promote good 
governance, actually impedes good governance implementation. Interestingly we also found 
that interviewees believe that the old ways of Soeharto is an impediment in decentralisation 
governing system, as bureaucrats from this era are very used to the centralised governing 
system and is not at all familiar with the decentralised governing system. As these 
bureaucrats are still in power, many interviewees believe that this play a large part in how 
decentralisation governing system will be implemented.  
 
4. Bureaucratic Generation Gap 
 
Section 3 suggests that political history is the root of good governance impediment variables. 
Although it is true bi-polar change is difficult and slow process (Adicondro 2002; Smith 
1971; Reynolds 1994), and it is without doubt that Soeharto’s old ways have made it mark on 
Indonesia’s governing system, we couldn’t help but notice that our interviewees frequently 
point out that underneath the political history and cultural change argument the real problem 
is the people that is governing. There are several interesting things that we found relating to 
this matter. Firstly we found that a constant “complaint” from interviewees is that there are 
still bureaucrats from Soeharto’s era in power, thus change is difficult as there is resistance to 
adopt new ways of governing. Therefore they believe a lack of bureaucratic reform is the 
reason for slow good governance implementation. This is an intriguing matter since high and 
middle level officials, in general, are able to provide us examples of how good governance 
principles are implemented within the region. Yet low level (and quite a few middle level) 
officials expressed their concerns that the people with power for change are reluctant to do so 
due to their inability to handle risks. We find this to be an interesting contradiction, one that 
may explain why we found there is a mismatch between good governance related regulations 
and implementation plans in regional government’s official documents and the reality of its 
implementation.   
 
Secondly, we found a positive relationship between the percentage of interviewees whom 
identified lack of bureaucratic reform as an impediment variable and the ‘age’ of regional 
government. A high percentage of Denpasar and Padang officials expressed the need for 
bureaucratic reform to enable good governance implementation, whereas only very few Solok 
and Gorontalo expressed the same view. As mentioned in Section 2, both Solok and 
Gorontalo have a higher good governance implementation level than Denpasar and Padang. 
Interestingly both Solok and Gorontalo are ‘newer’ regions – they were formed after 
decentralisation autonomy governing system was introduced, whereas Denpasar and Padang 
are considered older regions – that is they were formed long before the decentralisation. In 
section 3 we discussed how it is feared that new regions may not be able to develop or 
implement good governance due to lack in resources and experience in governing. Our 
findings however, as discussed in section 2, show that Solok and Gorontalo are in fact more 
advanced in their implementation of good governance. This suggests that lack of resources 
and experience in governing may not be the exact argument to explain good governance 
implementation.  
 
We were intrigued at the positive relationship between the age of a region and the effect of 
bureaucratic reform on good governance implementation. Looking at the work experience of 
interviewees in all four regions we found an interesting contrast – Denpasar and Padang 
officials’ records show that they have been in the civil service for their whole career, whereas 
Solok and Gorontalo officials have held various positions prior to taking up civil service post 
ranging from academics, private entrepreneurs, and other civil service positions. Solok and 
Gorontalo officials acknowledge the hold that culture has on people’s perceptions and way of 
doing things, thus to anticipate the resistance and ensure innovation they have employed 
people that do have bureaucratic/civil service history in their work experience. What Solok 
and Gorontalo has done confirms the works of (Bardill 2000; Case 1994; Hellman et al. 2000; 
Tambunan 2000; Warren 2005), who all believed that for good governance to exist and be 
implemented there needs to be a change in the mindset of the people who are implementing 
the principles. This is especially true for a nation that has experienced a long unchanged 
governing system and where the proposed change is of bi-polar characteristics.  
 
The shift in regional government official work experience, from that of bureaucratic 
background to non-bureaucratic background, in Solok and Gorontalo reflects the current 
change in Indonesian government human capital resources. It has been noted that prior to 
Asian financial crises in 1997, government positions were filled by bureaucrats who have had 
bureaucratic training all throughout their career. After the Asian financial crises however 
there has been a change in government official’s background – government departments are 
employing academics, former private sector employees, entrepreneurs, and international 
institutions members. This change is motivated by several reasons. According to Bardill 
(2000) this change reflects Indonesia’s seriousness in eradicating corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism. Government officials employed prior to Asian financial crises are ingrained with 
Soeharto’s governing system which was found to be entrenched with corruption, collusion, 
and nepotism. In order to eradicate this and implement good governance there is a need for a 
change in mind-set. Thus it is deemed appropriate to employ people who advocate good 
governance (i.e international institution members) and those who would have fresh ideas on 
how to govern. These candidates are also deemed appropriate since they are not ingrained 
with Soeharto’s governing system and are motivated to not only see a better Indonesia but to 
restore Indonesia’s position as one of the Asian tigers. It is suggested that the change in 
government official background will reflect the change in mind-set, which is what is needed 
for a bi-polar change to happen. Another explanation to the change in government official 
background is to act as an educator within the government, especially in terms of how to 
govern the government more towards the private sector perspective as opposed to the public 
sector perspective. This way it is hoped that the government would apply some of the 
techniques that private sector applies in day to day business engagements, resulting in a 
government body that is more professional and competitive. Academics are brought on board 
to present their fresh ideas on how to govern after years of academic research. Another 
explanation for the change in government official background is to increase the Indonesian 
people’s trust towards the government. During Asian financial crises 1997 the trust of 
Indonesian people towards the government lowered significantly due to unearthed corruption, 
collusion, nepotism; and the fact that a financial crises happened. A lot of blame was put on 
the government, in particular towards the governing system and the people within the 
government. It is hoped that with the change in government official’s background the 
Indonesian people would feel that their voices are represented in the government and that 
change in the governing system is possible.  
 
The effect of this change has been both positive and negative. As explained above the change 
in government official personnel have had several positive results, such as; an increase in the 
Indonesian people’s morale and trust (in the government), revival of Indonesia’s potential in 
the eyes of international institutions, proposed changes in Indonesia’s governing system, and 
proven cases of eradication of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. As discussed earlier, a 
primary example of a positive result is Solok and Gorontalo’s case, where the change has 
resulted in higher levels of good governance implementation. This change also brought 
negative effects including differences in points of view and in the ‘way of doing things.’  Our 
interviewees hinted that this gap impedes good governance implementation, as the ‘older’ 
bureaucrats are still struggling with change whereas the ‘newer;’ bureaucrats are pushing for 
change at a pace that is considered to be “too fast”.  
 
It is noted that even in Solok and Gorontalo there are a few challenges faced due to this 
change, where often the perspectives of the two bureaucratic generations clashed. Although 
the ‘older’ bureaucrat acknowledge the point of views and proposed changes of ‘newer’ 
bureaucrats, as well as the merit of their ideas for further development, they also expressed 
concerns that these ideas are very idealistic and do not take into account the bureaucratic 
culture within Indonesian regional governments that has been cultivated over past years. One 
of the main comments made by ‘older’ bureaucrats regarding this change is their concern 
over the lack of governing or government training that these new officials have. It is feared 
that the new government officials would impose unrealistic expectations on new ways of 
governing and the speed of change as they have no or limited experience in governing. On 
the other hand ‘newer’ bureaucrats believe that for change to occur there needs to be a 
significant  change in mind-sets, however ‘older’ bureaucrats are still reluctant to do so which 
in turn impedes introducing new policies and influences the level of implementation.  
 
We conclude that the bureaucratic generation gap is another double edged sword.  On one 
hand it provides fresh ideas, advocates change, builds morale and trust, and revives 
Indonesia’s image in the eyes of the international society. On the other it is a source of 
conflict and uncertainty. A key issue is that the ‘bureaucratic generation gap’ as discussed 
here, encourages new policies to be written and introduced; however it impedes the 
implementation as well as potentially undermining the intent and benefits of introducing the 
change.  Whether the bureaucratic generation gap actually impedes implementation processes 
of good governance or not remains an open question as there is evidence of both positive and 
negative impacts.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The level of good governance implementation in regional governments within Indonesia 
proves to be an intriguing area of research as evidence suggests that regional governments 
have the capacity, tools, and motivation to implement it yet the level of implementation 
remains questioned. Thus it is necessary to investigate the impeding factors to the 
implementation of governance policies, which can be taken into account by decision makers 
at regional government to modify or improve good governance guidelines in order to ensure 
high level of implementation.  
 
Previous research in this area has identified several impeding variables, it is found that 
political history and regional government culture play a dominant part in impeding good 
governance, as the governing ways of the past 32 years during Soeharto’s era is heavily 
ingrained within the government body and change is a phenomenon that will take time to take 
place.  
 
This study takes these findings further, investigating the effects of a ‘bureaucratic generation 
gap’ on the implementation of good governance policies. The genesis of this ‘gap’ both at a 
national and a regional level was access to a wider human resources pool to fill government 
positions post 1997 Asian financial crises. In order to eradicate corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism the central government was committed on having a government that reflects a wider 
talent pool. This included entrants from academia, the private sector, international 
institutions, foreign nationals and new graduates.    
 
Such an exercise has proven to be challenging so far, as there is “hidden” conflict within the 
bureaucracy in regards to changing its ways. Although ‘newer’ bureaucrats are eager to 
enforce change and implement good governance policies, ‘older’ bureaucrats are still 
struggling to change its mindset from the ‘old’ ways of Soeharto’s era. This hidden conflict 
has resulted in delayed approval of new policies and hurdles in new policies implementation. 
Therefore it is concluded that the existence of this generation gap contributed significantly to 
difficulties in effectively implementing governance practices across regional Indonesia.  
 
6. References 
 
Adicondro, G. J. 2002. Suharto Has Gone But the Regime Has Not Changed. In Stealing from 
the People: 16 studies on Corruption in Indonesia, ed. R. Holloway. Jakarta: Aksara 
Foundation for Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia.   
 
Anderson, K. and A. Strutt. 1999. Impact of East Asia's Growth Interruption and Policy 
Responses: The Case of Indonesia. Asian Economic Journal 13 (2):205-218. 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8381.00081  
 
Bardill, J. E. 2000. Towards a culture of good governance: the Presidential Review 
Commission and public service reform in South Africa. Public Administration & 
Development 20 (2):103. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=349894481&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. and A. A. Goldsmith. 2004. Good Governance, Clientelism, and 
Patrimonialism: New Perspective on Old Problems. International Public Management 
Journal 7 (2):163. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=810367311&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Case, W. 1994. Elites and Regimes in Comparative Perspective: Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Malaysia. Governance 7 (4):431-460. http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1994.tb00191.x  
 
Connors, M. K. 1999. National Good Governance: A Thailand Recovery Strategy / Civic 
Consciousness / Cooperation and Community in Rural Thailand: An Organisational 
Analysis of Participatory Rural... Journal of Contemporary Asia 29 (4):547. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1094474271&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=3
09&VName=PQD  
 
Curtiss, R. H. 1999. Indonesia, Asia's "Country of the Future," Begins a New Era as a True 
"Working Democracy". The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs XVIII (8):7. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=592494291&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Hellman, J., G. Jones, D. Kaufmann and M. Schankermann. 2000. Measuring Governance, 
Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business 
Environment in Transition Economies, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2312. 
Washington DC: World Bank.   
 
Henley, D. 2002. Population, Economy and Environment in Island Southeast Asia: An 
Historical View with Special Reference to Northern Sulawesi. Singapore Journal of 
Tropical Geography 23 (2):167-206. http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9493.00124  
 
Lewis, B. D. 2005. Indonesian Local Government Spending, Taxing and Saving: An 
Explanation of Pre- and Post-decentralization Fiscal Outcomes. Asian Economic 
Journal 19 (3):291-317. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-
8381.2005.00214.x  
 
Li, J. S. 2003. Relation-based versus Rule-based Governance: an Explanation of the East 
Asian Miracle and Asian Crisis. Review of International Economics 11 (4):651-673. 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9396.00409  
 
Love, A. R. 1992. Participatory Development and Democracy. Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. The OECD Observer (173):4. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=910333261&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Mardiasmo, D., P. Barnes and Y. Sakurai. 2008. Good Governance Implementation at 
Regional Governments in Indonesia: The Challenges. In XXII International Research 
Society for Public Management (IRSPM). Brisbane Australia. 
 
McLeod, R. H. 2000. Soeharto's Indonesia: A Better Class of Corruption. Agenda 7 (2):99-
112.   
 
Notten, M. 1984. Make Governments Compete for People. Economic Affairs 4 (3):13-17. 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0270.1984.tb01615.x  
 
Resksodiputro, M. 2002. Corruption in the Indonesian Legal System. In Stealing from the 
People: 16 Studies on Corruption in Indonesia. Book 2, The Big Feast: Soldier, 
Judge, Banker, Civil Servant, ed. R. Holloway. Jakarta: Aksara Foundation for 
Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia.   
 
Reynolds, L. 1994. Can government be reinvented? Management Review 83 (1):14. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=642772&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=309&
VName=PQD  
 
Smith, T. M. 1971. Corruption, Tradition, and Change. Indonesia 11:21-40.   
 
Soesastro, H. 2000. Indonesia's Crisis: Implications for the Region. Asian-Pacific Economic 
Literature 14 (1):23-35. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-
8411.00073  
 
Tambunan, M. 2000. Indonesia's new challenges and opportunities: Blueprint for reform after 
the economic crisis. East Asia : An International Quarterly 18 (2):50. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=64932555&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=309
&VName=PQD  
 
Taylor, D. W. 2000. Facts, myths and monsters: Understanding the principles of good 
governance. The International Journal of Public Sector Management 13 (2/3):108. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=218621731&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Verschoor, C. C. 2002. It isn't enough to just have a code of ethics. Strategic Finance 84 
(6):22. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=249513381&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Warren, C. 2005. Mapping Common Futures: Customary Communities, NGOs and the State 
in Indonesia's Reform Era. Development and Change 36 (1):49-73. 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0012-155X.2005.00402.x  
 
WorldBank. 2004. Combating Corruption In Indonesia: Enhancing Accountability for 
Development. Ed. W. B. E. A. a. P. R. P. R. a. E. M. Unit. Jakarta, Indonesia: The 
World Bank Office Jakarta.   
 
 
Adicondro, G. J. 2002. Suharto Has Gone But the Regime Has Not Changed. In Stealing from 
the People: 16 studies on Corruption in Indonesia, ed. R. Holloway. Jakarta: Aksara 
Foundation for Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia.   
 
Anderson, K. and A. Strutt. 1999. Impact of East Asia's Growth Interruption and Policy 
Responses: The Case of Indonesia. Asian Economic Journal 13 (2):205-218. 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8381.00081  
 
Bardill, J. E. 2000. Towards a culture of good governance: the Presidential Review 
Commission and public service reform in South Africa. Public Administration & 
Development 20 (2):103. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=349894481&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Beeson, M. 2001. Globalization, Governance, and the Political-Economy of Public Policy 
Reform in East Asia. Governance 14 (4):481-502. http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0952-1895.00170  
 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. and A. A. Goldsmith. 2004. Good Governance, Clientelism, and 
Patrimonialism: New Perspective on Old Problems. International Public Management 
Journal 7 (2):163. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=810367311&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Case, W. 1994. Elites and Regimes in Comparative Perspective: Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Malaysia. Governance 7 (4):431-460. http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0491.1994.tb00191.x  
 
Connors, M. K. 1999. National Good Governance: A Thailand Recovery Strategy / Civic 
Consciousness / Cooperation and Community in Rural Thailand: An Organisational 
Analysis of Participatory Rural... Journal of Contemporary Asia 29 (4):547. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1094474271&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=3
09&VName=PQD  
 
Court, J. 2002. Opportunities and Challenges in Assessing Governance and Human Rights: 
Findings from a Survey of 16 Developing and Transition Countries. Paper read at 
Seminar on Human Rights and Statistics, 27-29 November 2002, at Brussels.   
 
Curtiss, R. H. 1999. Indonesia, Asia's "Country of the Future," Begins a New Era as a True 
"Working Democracy". The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs XVIII (8):7. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=592494291&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Doornbos, M. 2003. "Good governance": The metamorphosis of a policy metaphor. Journal 
of International Affairs 57 (1):3. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=443656441&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Hausermann, J. 2002. Measuring Democracy and Good Governance: A Human Rights 
Approach. Paper read at Measuring Democracy and Good Governance, at 
Eurostat/CDG Munich Centre.   
 
Hellman, J., G. Jones, D. Kaufmann and M. Schankermann. 2000. Measuring Governance, 
Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business 
Environment in Transition Economies, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2312. 
Washington DC: World Bank.   
 
Henley, D. 2002. Population, Economy and Environment in Island Southeast Asia: An 
Historical View with Special Reference to Northern Sulawesi. Singapore Journal of 
Tropical Geography 23 (2):167-206. http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9493.00124  
 
Hout, W. 2002. Good Governance and Aid: Selectivity Criteria in Development Assistance. 
Development and Change 33 (3):511-527.   
 
Huther, J. and A. Shah. 1998. Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate 
on Fiscal Decentralization, World Bank Operations Evaluation Department Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 1894. Washington DC: World Bank.   
 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton. 2000. Governance Matters: From 
Measurement to Action, Finance and Development. Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund.   
 
Knack, S. 2002. Governance and Growth: Measurement and Evidence. Paper read at Forum 
Series on the Role of Institutions in Promoting Growth, at Washington DC.   
 
KNKG. 2006. Konsep Penyempurnaan Pedoman Umum Good Corporate Governance. 
Jakarta, Indonesia: Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance.   
 
Lewis, B. D. 2005. Indonesian Local Government Spending, Taxing and Saving: An 
Explanation of Pre- and Post-decentralization Fiscal Outcomes. Asian Economic 
Journal 19 (3):291-317. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-
8381.2005.00214.x  
 
Li, J. S. 2003. Relation-based versus Rule-based Governance: an Explanation of the East 
Asian Miracle and Asian Crisis. Review of International Economics 11 (4):651-673. 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9396.00409  
 
Love, A. R. 1992. Participatory Development and Democracy. Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. The OECD Observer (173):4. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=910333261&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Mardiasmo, D., P. Barnes and Y. Sakurai. 2008. Good Governance Implementation at 
Regional Governments in Indonesia: The Challenges. In XXII International Research 
Society for Public Management (IRSPM). Brisbane Australia. 
 
McLeod, R. H. 2000. Soeharto's Indonesia: A Better Class of Corruption. Agenda 7 (2):99-
112.   
 
Notten, M. 1984. Make Governments Compete for People. Economic Affairs 4 (3):13-17. 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0270.1984.tb01615.x  
 
Resksodiputro, M. 2002. Corruption in the Indonesian Legal System. In Stealing from the 
People: 16 Studies on Corruption in Indonesia. Book 2, The Big Feast: Soldier, 
Judge, Banker, Civil Servant, ed. R. Holloway. Jakarta: Aksara Foundation for 
Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia.   
 
Reynolds, L. 1994. Can government be reinvented? Management Review 83 (1):14. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=642772&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=309&
VName=PQD  
 
Smith, T. M. 1971. Corruption, Tradition, and Change. Indonesia 11:21-40.   
 
Soesastro, H. 2000. Indonesia's Crisis: Implications for the Region. Asian-Pacific Economic 
Literature 14 (1):23-35. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-
8411.00073  
 
Tambunan, M. 2000. Indonesia's new challenges and opportunities: Blueprint for reform after 
the economic crisis. East Asia : An International Quarterly 18 (2):50. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=64932555&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=309
&VName=PQD  
 
Taylor, D. W. 2000. Facts, myths and monsters: Understanding the principles of good 
governance. The International Journal of Public Sector Management 13 (2/3):108. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=218621731&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Verschoor, C. C. 2002. It isn't enough to just have a code of ethics. Strategic Finance 84 
(6):22. 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=249513381&Fmt=7&clientId=14394&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD  
 
Warren, C. 2005. Mapping Common Futures: Customary Communities, NGOs and the State 
in Indonesia's Reform Era. Development and Change 36 (1):49-73. 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0012-155X.2005.00402.x  
 
WorldBank. 2004. Combating Corruption In Indonesia: Enhancing Accountability for 
Development. Ed. W. B. E. A. a. P. R. P. R. a. E. M. Unit. Jakarta, Indonesia: The 
World Bank Office Jakarta.   
 
 
 
